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Guinea-Bissau:

24 September 1973 and Beyond
Richard Lobban

On 24 September 1973 history was made in Africa. The first subSaharan African nation unilaterally declared its sovereignty from
European colonialism following a protracted armed struggle. Most
African nations gained their independence from colonial powers by
negotiation and peaceful transfer of authority. True enough, this
transfer was sometimes linked with prolonged periods of demonstrations, strikes, and nationalist propagandizing, but with the exception of Algeria (and perhaps Ethiopia) there were no wars of
national liberation which led to a declaration of independence until
Guinea-Bissau. The implications of this move are immense.
The emergence of the PAIGC (African Party for Independence in
Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands) in 1956 was the first
necessary step which brought about the great event of 24 September
1973. The declaration on this date by the 120 members of the National
Popular Assembly is not an arbitrary event but symbolizes a result of
seventeen long and bloody years of struggle. Accordingly we must first
look back to see where the PAIGC has come from in order to judge the
importance of the declaration and to suggest some of the coming
events.

Historical Prelude

The small triangle of former Portuguese territory in West Africa,
Guinea-Bissau, is sandwiched between Senegal and Guinea-Conakry,
both former French colonies. Today this is the scene of the most advanced political and military struggle against Portuguese colonialism
in Africa. From the earliest days of Portuguese contact dating to 1446,
the African people sought to maintain their independence. Not until the
19th century did the Portuguese (or any colonial power) make any
major effort to penetrate the interior of Africa beyond their coastal
trading and slaving centers. Immediately after the partition of Africa
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in the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 the African people of
Guinea-Bissau launched an armed struggle against the Portuguese.
Fighting sputtered on and off from 1886 to 1936 when military rule was
finally brought to the 14,000 square miles of flat and often marshy
countryside. Strict repression and control earned the Portuguese
about two decades of relative peace. After the second war of the imperialist powers, African nationalists found Europe weak,
disorganized, and unable to continue the colonial structure. As early as
1948 young African students such as Amilcar Cabral (then 24 years
old), Agostinho Neto, and Mario de Andrade met in Lisbon and began
discussing the futures of their respective nations which were still
under colonial rule. Within a dozen years of these informal talks
several North African countries had already moved to end
colonialism. By 1956 a handful of Africans met secretly in Bissau to
chart their own future toward independence. A year later Ghana broke
away from England. The small group in Bissau felt that they were
simply moving along with the tide of world events and that the formation of the PAIGC would subsequently lead them to freedom from
colonialism as it had their African brothers and sisters. The basic
strategy was to unite the few intellectuals and the progressive workers
in a series of strikes and demonstrations that would convince the
Portuguese authorities of the futility of their colonial enterprise. Based
on reports of this nationalist activity the Portuguese secret police or
PIDE (now known as DGS) arrived in Bissau in 1957. On 3 August 1959
in the Pidjiguiti dock area in Bissau a strike of longshoremen was
brutally suppressed with at least fifty killed and more wounded. This
setback brought the leadership of the PAIGC to two conclusions. First,
the Portuguese were not about to grant independence to their African
colonies. Second, the tactics of strikes, demonstrations, and petitions
would not be sufficient to gain national liberation.
The small party determined that only a protracted armed struggle
would ever allow them to reach their goal. For more than three years a
clandestine network of PAIGC supporters was built up and many
received military training for guerrilla warfare. At the same time a
careful analysis of the class and ethnic structure of Guinea-Bissau was
formulated in order to determine who could be counted as friend and

who should be considered as an enemy of the movement. The successes of the PAIGC can be attributed, in part, to this careful stage of
planning and preparation. The concept of the 'foco' had no place in the
tactics of the PAIGC. Basic organization preceded rather than
followed military activities in contrast to the Debray or Guevara
models which rely on 'armed propaganda' for popular mobilization.
The armed struggle began in the south across from Guinea-Conakry
but the meticulous planning accounted for the opening of the North
Front within six months. The initial gains by the PAIGC stunned the
Portuguese who were still reeling from the bold attacks of the MPLA in
Angola in 1961. By February 1964 the politico-military struggle was
16
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sufficiently advanced to call the first national congress inside
liberated zones. The first national elections were held in 1972. Today
eighty percent of the country is under PAIGC control; the Portuguese
remain only in the major towns and in a number of fortified posts,
which have now begun to fall to the PAIGC. No place in the entire
country has been immune from attacks.

The Portuguese Fight Back

The Portuguese, with vital support from the NATO countries and
particularly the United States have fought to hold every inch of the
territory with their 40,000 troops. Some Portuguese have been trained
in counter-insurgency tactics in the United States itself where they
learned the use of napalm, defoliants, and the strategic hamlet system
of population concentration.
In November 1970 the Portuguese launched an attack on the main
PAIGC external office in Conakry. They hoped to kill Cabral, crush the
PAIGC and to topple the radical government of Sekou Toure. None of
these objectives was achieved and the invasion was completely routed
with the mobilization of the local militia and regular armed forces.
A little more than three years later the Portuguese tried again.
This time, on 20 January 1973, they succeeded in assassinating the
founder of the PAIGC and temporarily kidnapped the new Secretary
General, Aristides Pereira. The murder was followed by a propaganda
campaign saying that the PAIGC had split over regional or political
differences. In actuality the PAIGC has emerged even stronger for this
sorry experience. In my travels in the liberated zones during June of
1973 I often asked whether the death of Cabral had been a blow to the
movement. Everyone agreed that the loss had been tragic and Cabral
will always be remembered with great love, but the movement was too
well organized and too strong for it to be stopped. In the Fall of 1972
Cabral had promised that independence would be declared before the
end of 1973. The PAIGC has kept his promise. Such have been the
highlights of the political events from the origin of the PAIGC to 24
September 1973.

On The Military Front

Other events of major significance have taken place. From 1963 to
1973 the Portuguese had almost complete control of the air. The armed
militants of the PAIGC and the people in the liberated villages were
constantly subject to barbarous air raids of napalm and white
phosphorus as well as defoliants and strafing. In fact, as the Por17
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tuguese lost more and more on the ground they relied more and more
on air power. However, from March 1973 to the present the PAIGC has
claimed almost thirty Portuguese G-91 NATO jets, helicopters of
French make, and a variety of other support aircraft. On one hand the
successes against enemy aircraft have been psychologically
devastating. Some Portuguese pilots have refused to fly over areas of
PAIGC control, and a commanding officer was put in prison for supporting his mens' refusal. On the other hand the erosion of Portuguese

air control has permitted bolder ground action by the PAIGC army.
Perhaps the most significant example of this is to be seen in the fall of
the fortified base at Guilege in the south. This base had been under
seige by PAIGC artillery for months but subterranean quarters,
trenches, barbed wire, and electronic minefields made it a difficult
target. With improved weapons the PAIGC brought down support
aircraft and tightened their control until the base was severely
demoralized by the PAIGC artillery, harrassing actions, and ambushes. The Portuguese fled from this base leaving much war material
and many documents behind on 25 May 1973. The fall of Guilege made
a hole in the Portuguese defense network on the South Front where
some of the greatest military activity has been. The Portuguese
commanding officer of Guilege was put into jail for his tactical retreat.
With the improved PAIGC weaponry the Portuguese are having a
harder time holding their fortified posts and a number have come
under harsh attack. Posts like Gadamael and the town of Cacine are
served by boat now that air support has become unreliable. Mining of
the rivers by the guerrillas will try to cut the flow of supplies to these
locations. The encirclement continues and will only increase in the
coming months.
The PAIGC and National Reconstruction

The war of the PAIGC is not just on the battlefield. Great strides
toward national reconstruction have been made. The nation has been
shattered by 500 years of colonial contact and has been derailed from
the track of history. New institutions and services must be constructed
to put the people back on the rails. Education under the Portuguese
was extremely limited. The PAIGC now boasts of more than 200
schools in the liberated zones and more than 250 teachers to staff them.
Headway is being made to eliminate illiteracy, develop a national
culture and literature, and create a written form of Creole as the
national language. All three Fronts have dozens of primary schools
and there is a nurses training school at the PAIGC Solidarity Hospital
at Boke in Guinea-Conakry. Each of the three Fronts has a higher level
primary school for boarding students. The more advanced students go
to the PAIGC Pilot School in Conakry where there is also a Kindergarten.
In the field of health the PAIGC has increased the number of
18
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doctors and has a network of field hospitals and 'sanitary posts' in t
liberated zones. In neighboring Senegal and Guinea there are larger
hospitals. For the more remote places in the country the 'sanitary
brigades' bring health services and medicines. In the area of health
and education the Portuguese lost the war before it even started.
The Declaration of State

Without an understanding of the activities and struggle prior to th

proclamation of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau one might fall into
error of assuming that the proclamation was simply a "propagan
stunt" as the Portuguese have said. In fact, the proclamation is b
solidly on more than a decade of armed struggle and developmen
the human and economic resources in the liberated zones.
Since the Fall of 1972 when PAIGC Secretary General Amilcar
Cabral visited the United States it was known that a proclamation
would be forthcoming in 1973. The plot against Cabral and the PAI
delayed the date, but, significantly, did not stop it. The date of
September, the 17th anniversary of the founding of the Party, w
determined to be the proper time. Unfortunately relations betwe
Senegal and Guinea-Conakry were ruptured just before the 19th
the actual declaration was not made until 24 September. The year h
not been spent idly, but great effort had been expended to guaran
the maximum amount of support possible toward the diplomatic
recognition of the new African nation. At the time of this writing more

than 70 nations have extended diplomatic recognition. They include all
black African nations except Malawi and most Arab nations. Among
major powers the USSR, The Peoples' Republic of China, and India
have also extended recognition. In the West, Guinea-Bissau has been

recognized by Guyana and Cuba. Several Eastern European nations

are on the list, including Yugoslavia and Rumania. Pressure is
building for recognition in Sweden, Norway and Holland. Both Norway
and Holland are members of NATO and it would be very significant if
they made the move. The recent change of government in Australia
has also led some to anticipate support from that quarter. At present,
more governments recognize Guinea-Bissau, not a U.N. member, than
Israel, which is a member of the international body.
Conspicuously absent in this listing are the Western European
nations, the United States, Canada, Israel, South Africa and the
majority of the Latin American nations. Canada and Ireland say that
they are studying the possibility but most others say simply that they
will take no action. At the recent 16th annual meeting of the United
States based African Studies Association, the then Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs, David Newsom, said specifically that the
United States would not recognize the new nation because it did not
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have a capital and did not actually control the territory it said it
controlled. The facts that the United States recognized Taiwan as the
government of all of China and the England-based government of
France as the only government of wartime France, and that numerous
journalists and a team of U.N. representatives have traveled in the
liberated zones of Guinea-Bissau do not get noticed in such an
argument. The United States and other NATO powers do not yet stand
ready to confront their poverty-ridden colonial ally in Europe Portugal. During the October 1973 Middle East fighting Portugal stood
alone among European countries in permitting the transit of American
arms and munitions to the Tel Aviv government. The United States
State Department is acutely aware of this and seems likely do amost

anything in its power to pay the proper "rent" for the Lajes (Azores)
base which Portugal allowed the United States to use during this crisis,
and the lease is up for renewal in February 1974.
It is already rumored in Washington that Portugal will ask for

funds of a similar magnitude to the funding supplied by President
Nixon when the lease was renegotiated after a nine year lapse in
December 1971. This aid package totalled $436 million of credits,
grants and loans. Moreover the Portuguese will, very likely, be
requesting modern military equipment to try to counter the improved
weaponry of the PAIGC. If other rumors are proved correct the PAIGC
may soon have fighter-bomber aircraft of their own with their own
pilots. Such potentialities would be very frightening to the Portuguese.
Reports from Bissau indicate that its anti-aircraft defenses may have
already been bolstered in anticipation that these rumors may be borne

out.

The fate of Guinea-Bissau at the United Nations is therefore a very
complicated affair, not unrelated to the events in the Middle East as
well as in Washington and Lisbon.

When the declaration of state was first issued some thought there
would be an immediate application for United Nations membership.
Actually United Nations regulations require that any new nation must
submit application for membership some weeks in advance and this
could not have been done. Current PAIGC strategy is to mobilize full
support before proceding toward formal United Nations application.
Activities at the United Nations

One of the most significant actions of the 1973 session of the United

Nations General assembly was the passage of a resolution which
"strongly condemned the illegal occupation by Portuguese military
forces of certain sectors of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and acts of
aggression committed by them against the people of the Republic".
The resolution (Agenda Item 107) was sponsored by 57 nations and
passed by a very wide margin;93 'For', 30 'Abstain', and 7 'No'. The
nations which voted 'no' were Brazil, Greece, Portugal, South Africa
20
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and Spain-all bastions of fascism-and the United Kingdom and the
United States. It was considered noteworthy that many members of

NATO abstained rather than vote 'No' as many had expected. A dozen
Western hemisphere nations voted 'Yes' on this resolution.
While this resolution should not be confused with U.N. membership for the Republic of Guinea-Bissau it is widely acknowledged
that it brings it a step closer to reality. Also significant is that it has
been proposed to the first United Nations Committee for a Conference
on the Law of the Sea that Guinea-Bissau be invited to participate.
Representatives of Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, Algeria, Cameroon,

Lesotho, Mali, Senegal and the Soviet Union all supported this inclusion. It was challenged by the Portuguese representative but his
statement was countered by a point of order by the spokesman for
Mauritius.

Within the United States a number of organizations, church groups
and Congressmen have called for U.S. recognition of the new nation.
Representatives Charles Diggs and Louis Stokes have been leading
forces in Washington, and a Committee to Support the Republic of
Guinea-Bissau has been formed in New York by the American Committee on Africa. Numerous demonstrations and pickets have brought
some pressure on the Portuguese Embassy, Consulates and Missions
in the United States.

Within Africa the proclamation has been heralded as a great
victory against colonialism and the Republic has been given full status
at the Organization of African Unity as the 42nd member nation. The
Economic Commission for Africa has also included Guinea-Bissau in
its organizational activities.

The current PAIGC strategy is to make the actual application for
United Nations membership "when conditions are right". Secretary
General Aristides Pereira of the PAIGC said that "It is essential that
an overwhelming majority of United Nations member states recognize
us beforehand."

Since resolution 107 was passed a subsequent statement was
moved which "reaffirmed the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle for
liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation
by all means, including armed struggle". On both votes the United
States voted 'No' as it did on the steering committee of the United
Nations when it was proposed to start debate on the admission of

Guinea-Bissau. The United States or the United Kingdom both have
veto power on the Security Council through which Guinea-Bissau must
pass in order to gain admission as a full voting member. Either of
these governments can stand in the way of progress towards independence in Africa as they have regularly done in the past.
In speculating about the United States vote on the matter at the
United Nations we must ask two questions.
21
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First, what will be Portugal's reaction if the State Department
decides not to vote against Guinea-Bissau? Officially and publicly
Portugal would, of course, be opposed, but let us not forget that Portugal 'lost' Goa with much fussing but no action. Portugal has witnessed an economic disaster in Guinea-Bissau, a sink-hole of military
expenditures with no relief in sight. Not only could Portugal live
without Guinea-Bissau, but withdrawal would provide the short-range
benefit of 30-40,000 extra troops for Angola or Mozambique. Losing
mainland Guinea-Bissau would be marginal to NATO strategy if the
Cape Verde Islands remain under Portuguese control.
On the other hand, the Portuguese rulers have probably accepted
the domino theory in relation to their African colonies and would
hesitate to give up Guinea-Bissau considering the psychological effect
it would have for the liberation movement elsewhere. But Africa, Asia,
and Latin America are graveyards of domino theories. Colonialists
and their offspring don't give up land by choice, they give it up when
they are forced to give it up and where they must. As the PAIGC grows
stronger the element of choice for the Portuguese is reduced. Although
they speak of a domino theory they would hardly give up Angola just
because they gave up Guinea-Bissau.
The second question is what is to be gained for the United States by
supporting United Nations membership for Guinea-Bissau. The United
States is presently quite isolated in the Middle East and Asia. State
Department officials do not want to erode African support. Standing
against Guinea-Bissau would certainly have the effect of alienating the
underdeveloped nations even more. If State Department planners
decide that Guinea-Bissau has more on the negative side of U.S.
foreign policy than on the positive side great pressure can be applied to
the Lisbon government. Everything considered, the United States does
not need Portugal as much as Portugal needs the United States. The
effort that Western European nations made to keep themselves out of
the Middle East hostilities has hardly done them much good as they
struggle with economic and energy crises. At this point there might be
several European nations which would permit transhipment of arms to
Israel. Even aerial refueling can be used if the absence of Azores bases
made it necessary. The Azores and Portugal are handy but are no
longer absolutely vital to American interests.
Thus we can see a number of compelling reasons for the United
States not to use its Security Council veto against Guinea-Bissau.
Notably absent from the reasons are any moral or ethnical concerns.
American priorities are determined primarily by economics, military
strategy and international political alliances. However, we must not be
too optimistic, judging from the American record at the United
Nations in keeping progressive nations from the membership rolls.
The present stated position is also opposed to Guinea-Bissau. But I
conclude that it is at least possible that the United States will not use its
veto. This is not to say that it is likely; nor is to say that Guinea-Bissau
22
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will forever be denied its seat. National liberation and independence
are the central themes of the 20th century. The United States veto can
do no more than delay the inevitable.
Conclusions

Clearly, much that happens on the international front is predicated
upon events inside Guinea-Bissau. We can expect that the PAIGC

infrastructure (as set out at the 2nd National Congress) will be further
consolidated. The numbers of school children and teachers will continue to increase. Health services will reach more people and will show
improvement in treatment capabilities as development aid increases.

More and better medicines will reach the people in more regular
shipments to the liberated zones. The PAIGC may increase its
mechanization and external transport. The small area in the northeast, representing the traditional lands of the Fula people, may show
further constriction. PAIGC control on the waterways will be accelerated in order to tighten the noose around the isolated fortified
posts. Attacks on the larger towns may increase. It will not be critical
that major towns are taken militarily since they may fall of their own
inability to function, a common outcome of protracted guerrilla

warfare waged from the countryside. These are some of the possible
elements of the scenario for the PAIGC in the coming years of struggle
against Portuguese colonialism.
Recently a European journalist, Jochen Raffelberg, traveled with
the Portuguese in the Boe area, but was asked to wear a bullet-proof
vest and was provided with a heavy military escort. When Raffelberg
wanted to leave his helicopter and look on the ground a landing zone
was secured in advance by Portuguese commandos. His stay on the
ground was limited to ten minutes even though an armed Portuguese
helicopter hovered above. The new Portuguese Minister of National
Defense, Dr. Silva Cunha, says that the PAIGC claims of liberated
zones are "lies" and "there are no liberated zones in Guinea-Bissau".
This statement was made at the ceremony which retired the Portuguese military governor from Bissau last year and installed a new
one with hopes of better luck against the PAIGC.
Plainly the Portuguese have gone a long way in fooling themselves
about their invincibility. It seems that it is up to the PAIGC to bring the
Portuguese up against the 20th century realities of Guinea-Bissau and
the world.
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